In My View

A trilateral multilateralism

This is a new, activist China in the realm of international affairs. This is a China slowly abandoning its Confucian suspicion of the outside world. It is showing an inclination to travel on a path, yet uncharted and claim its rightful place as a big power with deep pockets.

Chinese president, Hu Jintao’s recent African safari pointed towards this realisation. A trilateral meeting held in New Delhi last week between Russia, China and India – represented by respective foreign ministers - is a crucial addition to major power politics. The loquacity of the Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing at the post-meet press conference signalled a broadening of Chinese engagement with the world.

Many experts believe, the new Chinese diplomacy is marked by increased degree of ‘flexibility’ and ‘sophistication.’ Indeed some say that China, though, still guided by the Deng Xiao Ping dicta – the two injunctions – (searching for) peace and development and to ‘keep one’s head down and never take the lead,’ Beijing is increasingly becoming less reactive and more proactive in its pursuit of foreign policy interests.

The latest round of Chinese intervention in curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have firmly placed these policies in the perspective of global conformism. It can clearly address the question in the minds of many whether China is ready to play by the current rules of international engagement, be it in the United Nations (UN) or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). For many, an answer in the affirmative provides a satisfactory reply to the query, is China a status quo power. Beijing wants the world to remain the same for next 20 years to provide the Chinese a prosperous life.

Russia on the other hand is a power in search of a grand strategy, guided by abiding interests. In the post-Soviet era, Russia is yet to discover moorings that could allow it regain some of its past glory. Sans the economic resources required to pursue activist policies in an increasingly unipolar world, and the ideological muscle to pull into its orbit other nations who would believe in a shared destiny, Russia finds itself adrift. In the early post-Cold War years, Russia had turned vehemently Eurocentric.

It had sought engagements with other European powers with the hope that it would gain coveted membership in many of the clubs like the NATO. Though it gained entry in the exclusive G-7 as the eighth member, it remained there more in the sufferance of the other members. On the other hand, it witnessed a growing encirclement as a large number of the former Warsaw Pact countries became members of the NATO. And by then Asia was rising, at last free of the encumbrances of the Cold War.

The idea of the Russia-China-India trilateral alliance was mooted by the former Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov in the mid-1990s. Even before it was to take shape, it had found enormously influential detractors. In India these critics used to call it a relic of the Cold War. For India had joined the economic liberalisers; and economic globalisation had become a mantra to be chanted with the same devotion as Vedic hymns require. Many in the country had believed that the nation’s future lay in aligning as closely as possible with the US and the West. An alliance of the kind Primakov suggested could only pit the country against its main potential benefactor, the USA.

But what has changed now? Supposedly the rhetoric of the latest trilateral meeting between the countries seeks of a multi-polar world. The three sides “expressed…” in their joint communiqué, “…their conviction that democratisation of international relations is the key to building an increasingly multi-polar world order that would be based on principles of equality of nations – big or small, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, international law and mutual respect." Many believed that this signalled their desire to challenge the US hegemony in world affairs. Is it really?

As the same meeting has clarified this trilateral is not designed to confront any existing major power, mainly the USA. Influential Chinese analysts believe that the country, either alone or in tandem with others, will not be in a position to take on the USA’s global presence in any significant measure in the recent times. With that scenario in mind, they aim at extending the country’s influence as much as they can. For Russia, though more strident lately against US policies worldwide, increased oil revenues have not yet provided the wherewithal to take on the West frontally on any issue. And India is happy to obviate the need to hedge for the future at a time when the going is good in Indo-US relations.

In that light, this recently held meet can be seen as an exemplar of two key phenomena. One, it is a process of accommodation of newer powers emerging in the world stage, and striking common ground amongst them. Two, this may be the germination of a conceptual framework for Asian powers (two thirds of Russia lie in the continent) to engage in a security dialogue for this part of the globe. Whether this leads up to a pan-Asian umbrella security organisation, time can only tell. Meanwhile, the troika has to survive in same measure the departure of George W. Bush and his neo-conservative globe girdlers from the policy portals of Washington. For an antagonism towards them appears to be the guiding motivation for many current international alliances, including the one germane to this piece.

Pinaki Bhattacharya, currently located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi (Kerala). He also writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at pinaki63@dataone.in