In My View

Make money talk back

With another $ 450 million dollars added to the initial $ 750 million in aid to Afghanistan, India needs to ask a few billion dollar questions. Taliban was ousted from power in 2002. A new government under Hamid Karzai was put in place in 2003. What has been achieved since in defeating al Qaeda and its religious radical brethren? A prime minister who can show enough guile to make opposition MPs defect before a crucial vote in Parliament, could surely find the gumption to ask a few questions off a new-found ally and a sponsor, the USA.

For, two recent RAND Corporation studies have laid bare the cupboard of the American strategies in fighting the al Qaeda and have found it bereft of any substantial idea that could throw up some hope for an ultimate victory. Now that India under Manmohan Singh has become an active partner in the US-led ‘war on terror’ (WOT) – as a result of which citizens of the country become targets of the terrorists while the prime minister moves around in armoured BMWs and fortified Embraer aircrafts – it behooves upon him that he asks George W Bush what the US is doing.

The two RAND studies – Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and How Terrorist Groups End – Lessons for countering al Qaeda – uniformly say that the military is too blunt a tool to deal with terrorism and insurgency. The first study says at one place, “The most significant lesson from Afghanistan is the importance of encouraging legitimate and effective indigenous governments and security forces.”

The two key words in that sentence are “legitimate” and “indigenous.” Clearly, the study has concluded that the US and allied forces in Afghanistan are neither. The study recommends dramatic improvement in eight ‘key’ areas. They are: police, border security, ground combat, air strike and air mobility, intelligence, command and control, information operations, civil-military activities.

Of these eight, the counterinsurgency (COIN) study suggests indigenous actors to take lead role in seven of them with the US military and civilian agencies taking support roles. The only aspect left to the US to take the lead is air strikes and air mobility.

The study acknowledges that Afghanistan’s devastated state institutions do not yet have the capacity for effective policing. The study notes, “There is currently a plethora of
U.S. government agencies involved in police training and equipping….However, they are plagued by a paucity of funding and civilian police. This forces the United States to either rely on contractors, such as DynCorp, or other states or organizations, such as NATO countries or UN civilian police.” Obviously, however much Bush would like to depend on his cronies in the private sector contracting business like DynCorp, the RAND experts have little faith in their abilities.

Cross border support sustains insurgency and terrorism. The al Qaeda and the Taliban take the permeability of the Durand Line to their fullest advantage, The COIN study notes, “In Afghanistan, the United States and other coalition partners failed to alter the will or capacity of the Pakistan government to decrease cross-border activity.” This has resulted in these groups being able to run their training camps in their sanctuaries and recruit at leisure. Obviously, these need to stop. Two elements in this exercise are, COIN operations against such sanctuaries; and choking off the funding sources for such activities of the al Qaeda. The colossal failure of the US in doing both is for all to see. Is it because it lacks the legitimacy to confront such forces? A question to ask.

How does Terror Groups End –Lessons for al Qaeda notes, “The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim countries, where its presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.” This restrained attempt at policy-talk does not hide the fact about how the US forces are viewed in large parts of the world.

Since the time Manmohan Singh’s friends have undertaken their WOT, the RAND study on terror groups computes that the number of al Qaeda attacks have increased manifolds; and so have their reach in geographical terms.

It suggests, “….ending the notion of a “war” on terrorism and replacing it with such concepts as counterterrorism, which most governments with a significant terrorism problem use……Individuals, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, should be viewed and described as criminals, not as holy warriors.”

And the report quotes an unnamed British intelligence official saying, “The notion of a war on terrorism suggests to Muslims abroad that the United States is fighting a war on Muslims. And the response has to be jihad, or holy war. War convinces people to do jihad.”

But these are voices of sanity which rarely breaches the cerebral cortices of the players in Bush administration. Indeed, if one accounts for the strands of logic followed by the US presidential candidates during their campaign pronouncements, one could not be greatly enthused about the future. It is a matter of grave concern for India that Manmohan Singh is most comfortable in their company.

Pinaki Bhattacharya, currently located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi, Kerala. He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at pinaki63@dataone.in