In My View

Pakistan: Flawed State

Successful conclusion of Parliamentary polls in Pakistan this month has given rise to a fresh bout of the rhetoric of ‘change,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘development.’ London’s Daily Telegraph has defined that change by the ‘imminent’ departure of Pakistan’s president, Parvez Musharraf. Some others of its ilk had begun speculating on polling day itself, whether he had kept an aeroplane ready for a quick exit to Turkey; a place he had reportedly confessed to have plans to retire.

Ironically, this last product of Western journalistic expertise – about Musharraf’s quick getaway to Turkey – typifies the tragedy that Pakistan faces. It is this that even the apex of the country’s bourgeoisie does not find it as a post-retirement haven. They are only there to plunder and help sink the country’s general population into absurd depths of misery, as recent history has recorded. Asaf Ali Zardari’s 48 million-pound estate in the United Kingdom is just the tip of the ice-berg.

Of course, it is a different point that Musharraf does not betray any such departure plans yet, as envisioned in this high decibel psychological warfare. But the next few months would be crucial for him to take a few giant steps that would define him as clearly different from the feudal-primitive capitalist lot that has been elected to the country’s National Assembly.

He has to show that he, being a Mohajir, is not there just to exploit the poor people as serfs like the feudals of the kind of Bhuttos or Zardaris. Nor is he there just to indulge in primitive accumulation like the Nawaz Sharifs who thrive in the dispossession of the peasantry.

The latter’s convergence at this juncture in a post-poll coalition is a last ditch attempt by the feudal-primitive capitalist bourgeois class to maintain control of the country on the face of disarray and destabilisation that could rob them their gains. They would also inevitably fall apart as their class interests conflict over time.

The rhetoricians of the ‘change; democracy; and development’ theory, or those who wallow in their not-quite-unusual ‘no change’ corners, could not have mistaken the popular verdict for this pre-capitalist order as the collective opinion of the mass of Pakistanis. If at all, it is an expression of their frustration at the lack of a nationalist bourgeoisie in Pakistan, thus exemplified by the low turn-out in the polls.

It might be safe to argue that the only nascent nationalist bourgeoisie that exists in Pakistan remains within the confines of the country’s armed forces and sections of the bureaucracy, who know that without the country they would not exist as the preferred recipients of all privileges in Pakistan.

It is important for Musharraf now to remove the traces of the comprador influences that work on the armed forces and its allied organs. One would argue, if he tries to move in that direction, it would dry up the biggest chunk of dollar denominated foreign direct investment (FDI) that comes into the country in the form ‘military Keynesianism.’

By that what I mean is this: the billions of dollars of Western foreign aid that pours into the country is mostly spent in the upkeep of the only State institution that survives, the armed forces. A large part of the funds then get recycled in the national economy of Pakistan thus fuelling the engines of public goods and services, only a small proportion of which ultimately reaches the people on the ground. So if Musharraf tries to eradicate the comprador-collaborationist class, he might end up cutting the hand that feeds the system, which would be deleterious for him.

But Musharraf is omniscient enough to understand where his comparative advantage lies. He knows that he has Washington tied up in knots by which it is imperative for the US government to continue to fund his ventures. The Bush administration or any other subsequent administration would be compelled to funnel in money into Pakistan because they know without the cash flowing in, the small beachhead they hold in Afghanistan would collapse. Even the experiment with the NATO taking up arms on behalf of America in Afghanistan is showing severe signs of exhaustion.

But is Musharraf indispensable to the Western capitals like Washington and London in that schema? The latter have shown enough signs in the recent past that they want to get rid of him because he talks back at them. He even takes their money and asks them to get off when they conflict directly with Pakistan’s interests. But Musharraf has survived because no credible alternative has emerged from within the armed forces yet to which the Western capitals can hitch their wagons.

Possibly, sizable sections of the armed forces have calculated that they do not have the stomach for the besmirching that Musharraf has already undergone, thus further undermining the institution from which they draw their strength. Some of them might also have been inspired to understand that their longstanding relationship with the Pentagon as a surrogate force has only eroded Pakistan’s national interest, thus cutting the very ground they stand on. They might have realised that this is the only time left for them to set the house in order.

However, the situation itself has changed, albeit only slightly, because of the general elections. The ‘military Keynesian’ largesse that would come into Pakistan now could develop a different dynamic with a rival power centre at the helm. Musharraf would have to look hard in the 1974 Constitution whether he can maintain his hold on the faucet. And he would have to look for expanding his power-coalition by incorporating the more progressive sections of the feudal-primitive capitalist class that has won the general elections. If he can do that he would be able to add more muscle to his core constituency of nationalist bourgeoisie existing in the army.

So a much vilified Musharraf is as much driven by the situation as he is the driver. He would remain in the driver’s seat only till he can satisfy the felt-need of his former colleagues of the armed forces for change. That change can come about, by Musharraf not becoming a Bonapartist as he tried to do with Kargil, but by constantly expanding the ranks of the national bourgeoisie through his actions and words. He has to be Pakistan’s fount of change. And he has the necessary tool for change: the armed forces. Supreme irony lies in the fact that it is also the reason why Pakistan is a flawed State.

Pinaki Bhattacharya, currently located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi, Kerala. He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at pinaki63@dataone.in