In My View

Nuclear Gauntlet

The United Progresive Alliance (UPA) had set a target in its first days in power. And the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) has delivered. In the process, it has put Dr Manmohan Singh government to a test for living up to some of its own promises made in the wake of the civilian nuclear deal being negotiated with the USA.

For the news, that DRDO has handed over India’s first submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to the navy; and that the attendant SSBN (nuclear powered submarine) will be ready next year, must have shaken quite a few decisionmakers in various world capitals out of their cocoon of predictability.

The development augurs a substantial shift in India’s nuclear posture if actually the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV) – as the nuclear submarine is technically called even now – takes to the seas next year. A SSBN requires a deployment posture qualitatively a world apart from the other two components of the nuclear triad. In the case of the latter two, a debate can be continued whether they need to be recessed or a ready arsenal. But in case of the former the missiles would have to be fully weaponised; with launch codes issued to the commander outside of the regular command and control suit.

For India that is particularly important, because the country has a stated second use doctrine. So theoretically, if the ‘first use’ by an adversary decapitates the nuclear command authority, it would devolve on the commander of the SSBN to give the necessary riposte of the ensuing Armageddon. And considering that India would not have high levels of redundancies built into its nuclear warfighting structure, the task of the SSBN/s would be onerous.

The news of the Indian SSBN coming into play next year follows information of last week that the new Chinese SSBN has been located at port and its picture available on Google Earth. Called a Jin-class or Type 094 submarine, which is expected to replace what is believed to be the unsuccessful Xia-class (Type 092) - a single boat was built in the early 1980s – the US Office of Naval Intelligence calculated in December, 2006 that the Chinese might have built five such boats.

In that light it is also imperative to take into account the prime minister’s statement at the DRDO programme this Saturday that India was not interested in an arms race.

But more importantly, this potential development could develop a kink in the country’s ongoing negotiations with the USA and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. The latter’s approach to the nuclear deal with India is markedly different from the way New Delhi would like to view them. For them the byword for an accommodation with India is ‘strategic restraint.’ That covers all aspects of nuclear weapons development; technological, doctrinal and operational. Considering the Indian SSBN would create a quantum leap in the country’s capacities, it would signal substantial changes in its nuclear posture.

This writer had written in 2004, in the Hard News magazine that “They (the new UPA government) will have to take tough decision in their five year term on how to pace the development of the nuclear powered submarine project (coyly termed Advanced Technology Vehicle) so the country can complete the nuclear triad. And then again once it gets completed, the government will have to decide whether to deploy nuclear armed ballistic missiles on them – an axiom that leaves little room for manoeuvre. This will have to be followed by extension the decision about how to define the command and control of those weapons aboard a submarine that stays underwater most of the time, thus creating communication hurdles.”

Singh’s government seems to have fulfilled the first condition of ascribing its approach towards the country’s nuclear deterrent – ‘pacing of the ATV project.’ They will now need to take the attendant decisions that create the operational environment for the SSBN.

The DRDO, on the other hand, has taken a major leap in unshackling itself from many of the calumny that has been heaped on it in the last few years. Faced with multi-billion dollar procurement plan of the armed forces that can make and unmake many fortunes, alongwith the USA making a serious bid to enter the Indian market on the back of its ‘strategic partnership,’ serious doubts were cast on the DRDO’s ability to deliver on promises about indigenous weapon systems. With this new development it has fairly responded to many of its critics.

But the UPA government has to begin where the DRDO would end. It will have to decide how far the precipitous slope of the nuclear mountain it wishes to climb, and where does the minimum mark of the ‘minimum credible deterrent’ lie. It will also have to decide how much its platitudes about not enjoining “zero sum games” carry. And from that perspective, how much will all this secure the people of India?

Pinaki Bhattacharya, located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi newspaper of Kerala. He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be located at pinaki63@dataone.in