In My View

The Sun and Pakistan: Mutual acquaintances?

Gen Parvez Musharraf has raised a sense of déjà vu. In the days of yore, when Pakistan was playing the role of a frontline state in the eastern fringes of the Cold War, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and later his hangman, Gen Zia ul-Haq were a security overseer for the American client states in West Asia, like Saudi Arabia. They had the men in terms of one of the largest standing army amongst all Muslim nations; and they held the spectre of what they were wont to call, the ‘Islamic Bomb.’

Musharraf’s latest diplomatic contortion in the process of his high profile West Asia initiative – being called seven plus one process – is a natural step forward in the lines the history of the country has drawn on sand. The current general, a more sophisticated showman than his less illustrious uniformed predecessor has donned the velvet gloves in a changed global environment. He has turned peacemaker. In the process he would like to not just ensure Pakistan’s place under the Sun, but more importantly break the record of Zia ul-Haq as the longest serving general in Islamabad.

He has been pulled up by Dick Cheney, the US Vice President who likes to hunt quail, and has been asked to do more, and more.... Almost in tandem, such venerable symbols of American establishment like the New York Times have carried unsubstantiated reports, complete with names of possible successors, about how the various US government agencies are debating a life after Musharraf in Pakistan. One would not be surprised if Musharraf is not found up to the mark in their supposed assessment, one of the next assassination attempts against him might actually succeed. He has survived far too many of them, Cheney might have conjectured.

The straw that Musharraf grabbed is quite interesting in its content. He is stuck out in a minefield that is possibly more dangerous than any he might have found in the middle of west and east Punjab. Nor is it even the familiar territory of some drumbeating on Kashmir to rally the forces. He has waded into the territory of Israeli-Palestinian conflict where the latest spin is the close nexus developing between Riyadh and Tel Aviv on the issue of containing the rising influence of Iran.

Clearly, like a good general with a poor tactical record (witness Kargil!) Musharraf had sought to create a pre-emptive diversion even before Cheney could read him the riot act. Ironically, the Americans have already indicated that they do not feel he exceeded his brief. While the Foreign Ministry in Islamabad was less global in their claims, the US State Department was not under any such constraints. Sean McCormack, the State department spokesperson had said at a recent briefing, “President Musharraf has made some recent trips around the globe to Arab Muslim states and non-Arab Muslim states to talk about a couple of….issues…One, how they can band together to address the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and also, two, how to, in some way, address the divide within the Muslim community between the Sunni and Shia.”

This rather detailed regurgitation of Musharraf’s agenda by a representative by of the Amereican government is an US endorsement of his actions. Naturally, the USA at the end of the tether with its efforts of reordering West Asia to its liking, would also like an outside chance to work, if its shows signs of success.

But for Musharraf the gamble is based on a ‘post-dated cheque on a failing bank.’ He also knows that neither al Qaeda’s operations nor Iraqi insurgency would stop at a time when the USA is hemmed in. He apparently found enough gumption to tell Cheney as much in his meeting. He had said that Pakistan has done “enough” in its fight against terror, and “joint efforts are required” for any further advances. He had even defended the agreement with the rebellious chieftains of north Waziristan concluded in September last. He apparently told Cheney that the chieftains need to be weaned away from al Qaeda by economic aid (financial bribes?) and political measures (restricted autonomy?).

For India, the first instinct would be to sit out the drama. But considering that it is an emerging power in the minds of its elites, the question to be asked is: should it? This could be the time when Musharraf would need some handholding. The process should begin to re-engage him on the issue that would gain him the stature to thumb his nose at his frayed American benefactors, and would be assasins: Kashmir. If New Delhi decides that this is the time to give Musharraf a fillip by abandoning, for the short term the gradualist approach, on the issue, and embark on some bold and open dialogues - beyond just niceties – about possible solutions.

This little initiative could well prove seminal in the long run in terms of relations with Muslims in South Asia. Musharraf too would gain the confidence of not toeing the Salafist ideology for the sake of survival and instead follow his original instincts of an Islamic reformer in the modernist mould. India would be a gainer by becoming the powerhouse fully engaged in the dynamics of the regional backyard.