In My View

North Korea’s nuclear gambit pays off

The high trapeze game ended with… well, a whimper. A fortnight ago, the USA bought North Korea’s compliance with nuclear weapons’ non-proliferation principles. The George W. Bush Administration had to recant most of its dogged stands about North Korea: no bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang; and freeze on all aids to the country.

Ahead of the Beijing meeting that clinched the deal, Washington’s negotiator with North Korea Christopher Hill had a bilateral meeting with his counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, in Berlin. And in the Budget Bush Jr presented to the US Congress an appropriation asked for $ 2 million as aid to the country, much before the Beijing Accord was inked. So what is this deal for which Washington bent its back so much? An understanding of this would only enhance one’s ability to comprehend what kind of a non-proliferation regime Washington is trying to erect on the decimated edifice of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The deal has four key elements:

- The first is the important aspect of reciprocity in fulfilling the obligations of the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of Six Party talks held in Beijing on 19 September, 2005. Earlier, the US government had insisted that North Korea should move first on the promises made in the joint statement.

- Most crucially from the Bush Administration’s perspective – the US President has called it a “breakthrough” - the North Koreans have agreed to “abandonment” of the Yongbyon 5-MW plutonium producing reactor facility. The latter has also agreed to invite back IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors and return to the mutually agreed “monitoring and verifications”

- The deal also clearly states that the two protagonist countries would begin talking bilaterally, thus addressing ‘pending’ issues bilaterally, progressing towards “full diplomatic relations.” Additionally, the US would start the process of dropping North Korea from the list of countries who are “state-sponsors of terrorism.” (Recall the ‘axis of evil!’)

- The Parties to the talks agreed to begin “cooperation” in economic, energy and humanitarian aid to North Korea. The first shipment of emergency energy assistance of 50,000 tonnes of Heavy Fuel Oil is to begin in the next 60 days.

Howls of protest have already surfaced not just in Washington, but from those who had been steadfast allies of the USA since the beginning of the Cold War – Japan and South Korea. Tokyo believes that Washington’s hurry to seal the deal in the Korean peninsula has left them in the lurch on the issue of their abductees, who they had alleged the North Koreans kidnapped over many years.

South Koreans believe this deal was merely an attempt to put a band-aid repair on the rickety structure of nuclear non-proliferation regime as it did not call for a complete reversal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. In their words, the deal leaves significant gaps in terms of Pyongyang’s alternative, Uranium enrichment programme bought off-the-shelf from the AQ Khan enterprise of Pakistan. Beijing Accord does not say anything about that programme. Nor did it say anything about the existing nuclear weapons arsenal of the country believed to be in the region of about eight explosive devices.

Main motivation behind the Accord was the desire of all the major players in the region – China, Russia and the USA – to bring stability in the Korean peninsula. Each of them feels that their vital strategic interests tend to get jeopardised by North Korea’s increasing bellicosity. China feels that the North Korean situation seriously threatens their need to uphold peace and tranquility for atleast two decades. Nuclear weapons in North Korea could directly motivate Japan to seek some deterrence of their own, which could directly challenge China’s rise. On the other hand, China believes that the North Korean regime of Kim Jong Ill has proved its survivality and an economic blockade of the kind the USA desires could have unintended results. China is also leery about the American long term strategic goal in the area.

Over the years following the end of Cold War, Russia has also deepened its relations of the Pyonyang regime. It now feels that it can independently communicate with the North Korean leadership. And it has played the spoiler in the USA’s attempt to isolate the regime by backing it selectively.

But on the main non proliferation plane the three are together in maintaining their individual monopolies over nuclear weapons. And this deal leaves gaping holes from that perspective. The deal has shown the world that the US intransigence on the issue can be successfully challenged by a clear enunciation of a national will. This deal seeks to only cap, and not reverse the weapons development programme. In fact, many believe that if at a future date the North Koreans decide that they would like to return to the path of development of nuclear weapons, they could.

This step, to seriously threaten the ‘stabilty’ plank of major powers, could not be addressed by a piecemeal approach to uphold the nuclear regime. It can only be addressed if the latter chose to seek a permanent solution to the problem. That permanence can only come when the powers decide that the nuclear weapons have entered the region of diminishing marginal returns in the context of big power projection. They will have to acknowledge that the deterrence logic of the nuclear weapons have been completely upended by the proliferation of nuclear material and technology. And the NPT could not stop it.

Then the goal would lie in a universal nuclear disarmament that did not discriminate among the nations. From that perspective, it would seem that AQ Khan did more to the cause of denuclearisation of the globe than Albert Einstein could, with his moral indignation about weapons of mass destruction.

Pinaki Bhattacharya, currently located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi (Kerala). He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at pinaki63@dataone.in