Thursday 11 January 2007

In My View - Thursday-Wednesday

On Kashmir, Musharraf unplugged

Pakistan’s President Parvez Musharraf is a master of public diplomacy. He had so upstaged a big showman like Atal Behari Vajpayee in Agra in 2001 that even a normally loquacious Vajpayee was left gasping for breath. At that time, Gen Musharraf had been trying to break free from isolation after staging a military coup, and in the aftermath of the Kargil misadventure. Today, he wants to win again: this time an election in 2007. And this time too he wants India to do him a favour by bolstering his chances at the hustings.

So in the last few weeks, suddenly there has been an accretion of messages from Islamabad. Some of them have been unpalatable to the usually tolerant lot of Pakistani journalists, few of whom apparently walked out of the Pakistan Foreign Office briefing in which the hapless spokesperson had to say that the country never had any territorial claims on Kashmir. Across the border, in India people sat up and took notice. Knowing Gen Musharraf’s ability for subterfuge they looked for pitfalls. But there are a few things that need to be considered before a judgment is passed on the new Musharraf proposal

First is the considerable improvement in bilateral relations. For the first time, people to people contacts between the countries seem like a viable alternative to the jaw-jaw situation that has existed for decades. Second, under international pressure, a large and an influential section of the Pakistani establishment seem to have come around to the view that their strategy of dealing with asymmetries through unconventional militaristic methods are becoming increasingly untenable. The global opinion has shifted from looking at the terrorism and militancy in Kashmir as isolated phenomena largely born from the disputed inception of nation building in the sub continent. Instead, they now look at these activities as an integral part of global terrorism where the vision is of religious revival, thus challenging the secular path of development.

On top of that, Musharraf and his fellow travellers also understand that if Pakistan has to survive as a viable state, they would have to forsake their dualistic strategy of sponsoring ‘freedom fights’ on the one hand, and reducing religious radicalism in the society at the same time. On his own, he is trying to deal with the latter on two fronts. First at the urging of his Western allies, he is clamping down on radical groups who are waging their jihad against the former, and second, he is encouraging the voices of liberalism and rationality in Pakistan to rise up. The recent Hudood law revision is a case in point.

One has to understand, that in Pakistan the existing political establishment consisting of Pakistan Peoples’ Party of Begum Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League of Mian Nawaz Sharif are severely compromised due to their corruption when in power, and their subterranean anti-democratic linkages with forces inimical to Pakistan’s national interest of becoming a strong, modern state. So while Musharraf rules the country and struggles to maintain a semblance of order, he also needs to develop political institutions that gain popular backing.

This is the backdrop against which India has to judge his latest forays in trying for a solution to the Kashmir. An important section of opinion in India possess grave doubts about Musharraf’s legitimacy in power, thus impinging on his ability to strike a lasting deal on Kashmir, that could be viewed as pathbreaking. A realistic appreciation of this aspect should actually begin from the belief that the Western powers have invested a lot of political capital in Musharraf as the frontline state in tackling Islamist insurgency. This has enabled the latter to have significant elbow room and crucially, time, to set the house right. In that scenario, he may be the best option India has in Pakistan. For the current Pakistan leadership understands that a deal on Kashmir could constitute an important leg for the globally important battle against Islamist revivalism.

So when Musharraf complains that his various attempts at public diplomacy are stonewalled by the Indian which consecutively seeks to better the last offer by their complete lack of response to the previous, one needs to take note. Indeed, there should be an appreciation in India that the timeline of 2007 should be given some credence and some political capital be invested in Musharraf, as there do not seem to be any other investible option existing in Pakistan at the moment. In this light, it is crucial to acknowledge the courage that was shown by the government in Islamabad to jettison a six decade old position on Kashmir.

Beginning from there, if one looks at Musharraf’s current proposal on Kashmir for identifying the regions of the troubled area; demilitarising them; giving them self-governance; and joint management of the resultant entity needs to be taken up. The deal itself is considerable improvement on the pervious positions of Pakistan on the issue. Plus, it provides enough negotiating space in terms of all the four goals to be achieved in a time-bound manner. The two national special respresentatives, MK Narayanan and Tariq Aziz should be credited for these immediate developments and allowed to begin thrashing out the details.

Of course, India should also keep a keen eye on how the gauntlet thrown by Gen Musharraf is playing out in Pakistan. That could well be decisive in this home stretch.

Pinaki Bhattacharya, located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with Mathrubhumi (Kerala). He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at
pinaki63@dataone.in.

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