Wednesday 10 January 2007

In My View - Thursday-Wednesday

Partitioned Iraq in post-Saddam future

The USA’s decision to accelerate the process of execution of Iraq’s former president, Saddam Hussain is possibly less pathological, and more diabolical, in its scope. Many had been flummoxed at the ‘strategic failure’ of Washington in not being able to gauge the level of Islamic ire at executing Hussain just ahead of the Id festivities. Many other US supporters, like Britain, have wrung their hands in frustration at the George W Bush administration’s endemic inability in understanding the sentiments of millions of Muslims.

But not many had given attention to the fact that the USA is on the verge of framing a new policy on Iraq, which is geared towards trying to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in West Asia. A crucial element in that is Saddam Hussain’s execution, its leaked video recordings; and the fallout. The central idea of this future policy is to grasp the nettle where the James Baker-Lee Hamilton bipartisan Iraq Study Group had left it. And the main theme of that policy has to be based upon the solid rock an American force withdrawal from the embattled nation, without a replay of the scenes of a helicopter-borne hasty departure from atop the Saigon US embassy.

Hence, the idea is to minimise longer term damage to US interests in the region. That can only be achieved by a partition of Iraq into three concurrent, but whittled down nations; that of the Kurds in the north, Sunnis in the centre; and the Shi’is in the south. The reason one comes to this conclusion is based on one’s inability to accept that the Bush Administration was unaware what would be the sectarian impact of an execution conducted by a government that is widely seen as Shi’i machinery for gaining supremacy. This fact need not have been buttressed by the shouts of ‘Muqtada-al Sadr’ as Hussain had waited on the gallows to be hanged.

But now that has happened, it has driven a firm wedge between the two communities that may remain irreparable in the medium term. If the Sunnis had a share of the country where there would have been oil, the division of Iraq would have taken place much earlier. In the north, the Kurds virtually operate as a separate nation. As the Sunday Times of London in October, 2006, the Shi’i leaders like the religious overlord of Iraqi Shi’is Abdul Aziz al-Hakim are pushing for “regional autonomy” – short hand for fuller separation. Notably, he visited Washington recently when he met the US President, Bush.

Interestingly, the first proposal for autonomy along sectarian lines in Iraq was mooted by the Democratic Party senator, Joseph R. Biden in May last year. Today, the Democratic Party controls the both Houses of the US Congress almost after 12 years. And they have to redeem their pledge to the American public that the troops would be brought back home. Biden’s plan had five elements: an Iraq of three regions (Shi’i, Sunni and Kurd), share oil revenues with the Sunnis promised 20 per cent of present and future oil revenue; an international conference leading to a regional non-aggression pact; all US forces to be drawn down by 2007 with a token 20,000 remaining as an anti-terrorist force; increase reconstruction aid with creation of jobs programme.

The biggest stumbling block in Iraq to this plan were the Sunnis who were loathe to be in a land without oil. With the legally heinous execution of Saddam Hussain, Iraqi Sunni sentiments would be sufficiently inflamed to lead them to a realisation that they would not be able to stay alongside the other two communities, over whom they had ruled for so many decades. This could also lead to a Sunni consolidation of sorts under the banner of Saudi Arabia, that could be welcomed with open arms by the USA.

While the immediate advantage of this plan would accrue in terms of stopping the daily bleeding the US interests are taking in the region – indeed the world – the long term goals would be better served by an American retreat now so that they can return on another day. In other words, the remaining US interests would be safeguarded for the moment if the nation’s forces depart from the explosive theatre, till the country can regroup. A partitioned Iraq would also create better opportunities for the big powers to play in maintaining their vital interests in strategic region. Smaller states out of a large Iraq can also pose less of a threat even if it falls in the hands of either the al Qaeda or Shi’i religious militants. They would then have a much smaller footprint, thus not endangering such steadfast US allies in the region like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

But Baker-Hamilton ISG had left this option out of its menu even though there is evidence it had seriously toyed with the idea as the earlier quoted Sunday Times report had stated. They had possibly given up on the concept as they could not find a viable solution to the oil problem. Hence, they have wished if the situation reaches such a pass, the US should ensure that the control of oil revenue, thus oil assets, are under a central control in Baghdad even if fissiparousness takes hold. Also, they might have felt that if they recommended such a path, Iraqis could vow not to let that happen and instead, listen to the remnants of voices still speaking in favour of Iraqi nationalism. And that would deal a body blow to the US national interest.


Pinaki Bhattacharya, located in Kolkata, is a Special Correspondent with the Mathrubhumi, Kerala. He writes on Strategic Security issues. He can be contacted at pinaki63@dataone.in.

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